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Recent Developments: Louisiana Class Actions 
Blaine G. LeCesne* 
I. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
The determination of whether a purported class action meets the 
requirements for class certification under Louisiana’s class action 
procedures has long been plagued by uncertainty, engendering 
inconsistent certification rulings, misconstrued precedents, and 
vague evidentiary standards for applying the class action 
prerequisites. Class certification analysis has also been untethered 
from any overarching policy directives concerning the appropriate 
level of scrutiny to be applied or the presumed preference for class 
certification when courts are confronted with close or complex 
questions. In two recent cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court not 
only brought much needed clarity to the class certification analysis 
but also made clear that usage of this unconventional litigation 
procedure should be judiciously authorized and limited to claims 
that arise from a common cause or disaster in mass tort cases. 
A. Price v. Martin 
In Price v. Martin, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to review whether the lower courts correctly applied the 
commonality requirement in certifying a class action filed on behalf 
of a class of 4,600 property owners who allegedly suffered damages 
resulting from the operations of a wood-treating facility.1 Plaintiffs 
filed suit against various owners of the facility, which was primarily 
engaged in the production of creosote-treated railroad ties.2 
Plaintiffs named three different owners who operated the facility 
over the 60-year period in question as defendants.3 The petition 
alleged that each of these defendants engaged in environmentally 
unsound practices, including failing to remediate spills at the 
facility, failing to contain creosote drippings, runoff, and overflow at 
the facility, and allowing neighboring residents to use trimmings 
from treated wood for cooking and heating.4 According to plaintiffs, 
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these practices allegedly caused the release of substantial amounts of 
hazardous and toxic substances including creosote, 
hexachlorobenzene, and pentachlorophenol contaminating the soil, 
sediment, groundwater, and buildings in the adjacent communities 
where they reside.5 Plaintiffs brought claims for nuisance and 
negligence seeking compensatory and exemplary damages for 
physical injury resulting from increased risk of disease, property 
damage, and diminished property values.6 
In response to plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, the district 
court certified a class comprised of all property owners who owned 
property within a one- and one-half-mile radius of the facility from 
1944 through the present.7 The Third Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s class certification despite noting several potential problems 
that would likely result in conflict, rather than alignment, of interests 
among the plaintiff class, including the exceptionally lengthy period 
over which plaintiffs claimed harm, different ownership of the facility 
during the period, and putative class members who were both past 
and current landowners.8 Notwithstanding these misgivings, the 
appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in certifying the class, assuaged by the trial court’s ability 
to modify or recall the class at any time prior to deciding the merits 
and the Louisiana Supreme Court’s prior stated preference for 
maintaining class actions when construing its prerequisites.9 
In granting certiorari, the Louisiana Supreme Court sought to 
review not only whether the lower courts properly determined that 
this case satisfied the requirements for class certification but also 
whether their analysis in doing so was sufficiently rigorous.10 At the 
outset, the Court delineated the guiding principles Louisiana courts 
should follow in determining whether an action meets the 
requirements for class certification under Louisiana Code of Civil 
Procedure article 591.11 First, the Court noted that to the extent the 
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class certification requirements of article 591 parallel those of its 
federal rule corollary, Rule 23, Louisiana’s class certification 
analysis is appropriately informed by federal jurisprudence 
interpreting Rule 23.12 The Court next clarified the plaintiffs’ burden 
of proof on the requirements of article 591, noting that it is more 
than the mere burden of pleading satisfaction of the requirements.13 
Rather, the class proponent has the considerably more strenuous 
burden of producing factual evidence that affirmatively 
demonstrates that the prerequisites for class certification have been 
met.14 Moreover, the general rule that courts should err in favor of 
maintaining class actions does not displace the “rigorous analysis” 
required in determining whether the prerequisites to class 
certification under article 591 have in fact been satisfied.15 
The Court next took aim at the two specific requirements under 
article 591 that it considered problematic in this case. The first was 
the prerequisite under article 591(A) that mandates that the party 
seeking class certification show that there are questions of law or 
fact common to the class.16 At the certification hearing before the 
district court, plaintiffs posited that the commonality requirement 
had been satisfied by one factual issue common to all class 
members: “whether defendants’ off-site emissions caused property 
damage to the residences in the area surrounding the plant.”17 The 
Louisiana Supreme Court, however, rejected this contention, 
explaining that satisfaction of the commonality prerequisite requires 
more than the mere existence of common questions in general; 
rather, the party seeking class certification must demonstrate that 
each individual class member’s claim can be resolved by reference 
to a common nucleus of operative facts.18 For mass tort claims such 
as these, each individual claimant must be able to prove, through 
common evidence, that defendants breached the applicable standard 
of care and that defendants’ conduct was the cause of plaintiffs’ 
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individual harm.19 As detailed below, after reviewing the 
uncontested facts in this case, the Court easily concluded that neither 
the issue of individual breach nor individual causation could be 
resolved on a class-wide basis by reference to common facts.20 
Regarding the issue of individual breach, the Court pointed to 
several circumstances that made it impossible for each class member 
to prove a breach of duty by defendants based on the same law and 
facts that any other class member would use to prove breach.21 The 
Court noted that the alleged forms of contamination resulted from 
three different owners who, independently of one another, engaged 
in varying operations that released different pollutants at unspecified 
times over a 66-year period.22 During this period, there were 
substantial changes in the law regarding the applicable liability 
standards23 and the availability of exemplary damages for the 
conduct at issue, as well as modifications to the federal 
environmental regulations governing the permissible level of 
emissions for some of the pollutants involved.24 Consequently, the 
factual and legal variability of proof on the issue of breach 
necessarily involved “different conduct, by different defendants, at 
different times, under different legal standards.”25 
Similarly, the determination of individual causation was fatally 
rife with proof variability issues regarding the source of the 
contaminants on each class member’s property, considering the 
“myriad area-wide and property-specific alternative sources of 
[those substances] in the defined class area.”26 As a result, proof of 
whether the alleged contaminants originated from defendants’ 
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facility would turn on a host of property-specific variables rather 
than be proven by a common core of material facts.27 
Importantly, the Court also corrected the lower courts’ apparent 
misapplication of its prior holdings that individual questions of 
varying damages among putative class members do not preclude 
class certification for lack of commonality.28 The Court explained 
that causation in a mass tort class action is an essential and 
substantive element of liability that requires proof by common 
evidence, unlike individual issues of quantum, which do not.29 Here, 
each claimant will necessarily have to rely on different facts, 
applying different liability standards, to show that each defendant’s 
varying emissions, during varying and independent periods of 
ownership, contaminated their individual properties with substances 
that could have originated from a multitude of sources other than the 
facility at issue.30 Such matters present questions of causation and 
liability, not damages, and substantive questions of causation and 
liability demand commonality for class certification.31 Relying on its 
precedent in Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc.,32 as reaffirmed in 
Brooks v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,33 the Court firmly reiterated 
its admonition from those cases that “only mass torts arising from a 
common cause or disaster are appropriate for class certification.”34 
The Court next addressed plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy the 
predominance and superiority requirements under article 591(B)(3), 
which mandates a two-pronged showing that common questions of 
law or fact predominate over any individual issues and that the class 
action procedure is superior to any other available adjudicative 
methods.35 The Court handily dispatched the predominance issue by 
referencing its previous finding of plaintiffs’ failure to meet the 
commonality requirement under 591(A).36 As the Court observed, if 
plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the threshold prerequisite of 
common questions of law and fact, it logically follows that such 
common substantive questions will not predominate over individual 
issues.37 
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With respect to the superiority prong, the Court focused on 
weighing the class members’ interest in individually litigating their 
claims in separate actions, which is one of the dispositive factors in 
determining the superiority of the class action device over other 
litigation procedures.38 The Court concluded that two considerations 
militated against a finding of class action superiority in this matter.39 
First, the disparity in strength of claims between past and present 
owners of the same property created conflicts regarding their 
respective damages that would be more fairly resolved on an 
individual, rather than class-wide, basis.40 Second, the fact that more 
than 500 such individual claims had already been filed tellingly 
illustrated the preference among putative class members to 
individually control the fate of their claims.41 
The Court also did not find that vindication of public policies or 
legal rights justified the costs and burdens of class litigation under 
these facts, particularly when individual proof is required to resolve 
each proposed class member’s claim.42 
In a strongly worded holding, the Court concluded that the 
district court manifestly erred in finding that the commonality 
requirement under article 591(A)(2) and the predominance and 
superiority requirements under article 591(B)(3) were proved.43 As a 
result, the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class.44 
B. Alexander v. Norfolk Southern Corp. 
In Alexander v. Norfolk Southern Corp.,45 the Louisiana 
Supreme Court considered whether the lower courts erred in 
certifying a class action arising out of a chemical spill from two 
railroad tank cars in New Orleans.46 The spill released ethyl acrylic 
fumes into the surrounding area, but no evacuation was deemed 
necessary.47 Approximately 20 people were treated and released at 
the scene for exposure to the chemical, and hundreds of others 
complained of eye, nose, throat, and respiratory irritations, along 
with noxious odors from the fumes.48 
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The class action requirement under scrutiny in this case was the 
predominance requirement set forth in Louisiana Code of Civil 
Procedure article 591(B)(3), which provides, in relevant part, that 
“questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members”49 The Court reiterated its declarations from previous 
cases that: 
[T]he predominance requirement is more demanding than 
the commonality requirement, because it entails identifying 
the substantive issues that will control the outcome, 
assessing which issues will predominate, and then 
determining whether the issues are common to the class, a 
process that ultimately prevents the class from degenerating 
into a series of individual trials.50 
Drawing from its recent decision in Price v. Martin,51 the Court 
again stressed that class action certification is warranted only after a 
“rigorous analysis” of “significant proof” that there is a common 
question that, when determined, will resolve an issue central to the 
validity of each claim “in one stroke.”52 
Against this doctrinal backdrop, the Court then admonished the 
district court for its less than rigorous reasoning in finding that this 
case presented sufficient commonality to warrant class certification— 
a finding that the district court supported solely with its summary 
conclusion that resolution of all or most of the claims shared in 
common the questions of whether the released chemicals and 
defendant’s negligence were the factual cause of the plaintiffs’ 
harms.53 The Court further criticized the district court’s failure to 
consider undisputed, highly probative record evidence that plainly 
demonstrated that each putative class member will necessarily have 
to offer different, individualized facts to establish liability and 
damages.54 Specifically, the determination of whether a claimant fell 
into the less than 0.1% of the population that would even be 
susceptible to manifesting physical symptoms from exposure to the 
extremely low concentrations of ethyl acrylate released in this case 
turned on a host of individualized variables including the claimant’s 
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health, medical history, and records.55 Likewise, determining the 
dose of exposure in each case would depend upon variable factors 
such as the location of the exposure and whether the claimant 
changed locations during the course of the exposure.56 Moreover, 
the damages–causation inquiry is further encumbered by the fact 
that the complained-of physical irritations are common symptoms 
attributable to myriad alternate causes.57 As the Court had 
previously cautioned against in Brooks v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Co.,58 certification of a class that required such individualized proof 
of liability and damages for each claim would yield the unacceptable 
result of the class devolving into a series of individual trials.59 
Consequently, the Court concluded that the district court erred in 
finding that common questions predominated under article 
591(B)(3) and in certifying the class.60 
II. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS 
During the 2012 legislative session, the Louisiana Legislature 
added two new articles to the class action provisions.61 One is a lis 
pendens mechanism directed at minimizing the potential pitfalls of 
multiple, duplicative class action lawsuits simultaneously pending.62 
The other is a forum non conveniens provision specifically designed 
for consideration of the most appropriate forum to hear a class 
action that could have been brought in any one of several available 
venues. Each of these new articles is tailored exclusively for use in 
class actions, addressing the unique multi-party features of class 
actions that would ordinarily preclude usage of the general lis 
pendens63 and forum non conveniens mechanisms in a class action 
context.64 
A. Class Action Lis Pendens 
Under new Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 593.1,65 
when two or more purported class actions have been filed in 
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Louisiana courts by one or more of the same plaintiffs suing in the 
same capacities against one or more of the same defendants in the 
same capacities, the defendant may object by filing a declinatory 
exception of lis pendens. Article 593.1 addresses two scenarios.66 
Subsection (A) authorizes the lis pendens exception when the class 
actions are filed in two or more Louisiana courts and arise out of a 
single transaction or occurrence in the same location.67 In this 
scenario, the defendant may have all the actions transferred to the 
district court where the transaction or occurrence occurred.68 
Subsection (B) authorizes the lis pendens exception when the 
class actions involve multiple related transactions or occurrences in 
different locations.69 In this scenario, the defendant may have all of 
the actions transferred to the district court where the first suit was 
brought.70  
The class action lis pendens mechanism under article 593.1 
resolves pending duplicative lawsuits differently than its general lis 
pendens counterpart under article 531.71 Under article 531, when a 
defendant objects to the filing of multiple duplicative suits, all but 
the first filed suit is dismissed, and if the defendant does not except, 
the first final judgment is conclusive of all the suits.72 Conversely, 
rather than dismissing or disregarding duplicative suits, article 593.1 
transfers all pending duplicative class actions to one district court for 
consolidated management and consistency in resolution. 
B. Class Action Forum Non Conveniens 
Newly enacted Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 
593.273 offers class action litigants the same option to transfer a 
class action to a more convenient forum as the general forum non 
conveniens provision does for more conventional litigants.74 Under 
article 593.2, putative class actions involving the same transaction or 
occurrence, one or more of the same plaintiffs suing in the same 
capacities, and one or more of the same defendants in the same 
capacities as a class action previously certified under article 591, 
may be transferred to the district where the certified class action is 
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pending.75 The transfer will occur if it is in the interest of justice and 
good cause is shown, upon contradictory motion filed within 30 
days of certification of the pending class action.76 
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